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In recent years, Poland witnessed a dramatic decline in its unemployment rate and, from having 
had one of the worst jobless records in the EU-27, the country now posts a figure below the Union 
average. However, this remarkable turnaround has apparently been driven by amendments to the 
country’s Labour Code, which have generated an enormous increase in temporary working. On the 
basis of gross flow data from five consecutive annual panels from the Labour Force Survey, the 
paper identifies a strong link between this growth and the fall in unemployment. A multinomial 
logit model then reveals the flows were most heavily concentrated among males and the less well 
educated. There was also some evidence that fixed-term work lured previously discouraged, 
inactive individuals back into the labour market. However, the requirement that Poland aligns its 
temporary employment legislation with that of the EU could conceivable lead to at least a partial 
reversal of these developments. 
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1.  Introduction 
Judged by the ambitions espoused in the successive Strategies to emerge in the wake of the Delors’ 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, Poland’s already relatively weak 
labour market performance deteriorated sharply in the years immediately following the formal 
recognition of the country’s application for EU membership in 1997. For example, its trajectories 
on the employment, unemployment and economic activity rates of all groups were counter to the 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda and its subsequent refinements.
1 Even on the eve of the country’s 
accession, official forecasts of its future labour market performance were not optimistic (E. 
Comm., 2004). In the event, the outcome was altogether more propitious, with a growth of over 1.6 
million jobs and a reduction of unemployment by 1.7 million over the years 2003-2007. While still 
far too low by Lisbon standards, this was accompanied by an increase in the employment rates of 
both men and women, which casts the epoch in sharp relief to earlier years of jobless growth.  
However, 85 per cent of the growth in employment over the period was composed of 
temporary positions, which places the development squarely in the terrain of a topical, 
wide-ranging and controversial debate that continues to provoke a steady stream of literature. As 
such, any empirical treatment needs to be selective in its approach and this paper is structured in 
the following way. The next section highlights the evolution of some major Polish labour market 
indicators since 1997, as viewed through the lens of the EU’s strategic policy objectives that have 
evolved over the past two decades. Section 3 examines temporary working across Europe and 
considers the relevant legislative frameworks in the EU, in general, and Poland, in particular. 
Thereafter, Section 4 seeks to explore the links between the growth in temporary work and the fall 
in unemployment, using panel transition data across seven, mutually exclusive labour market 
states drawn from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). A multinomial logit model is then employed to 
identify the characteristics of those who have been most likely to enter non-permanent jobs from 3 | Page 
 
the other labour market locations identified here. Section 5 represents a postscript and considers 
the potential durability of the changes observed on the Polish labour market to 2007 in the light of, 
first, the hard law emanating from the Commission in apparent support of the Union’s strategic 
ambitions and, second, the world economic crisis, which impacted in the final year of this paper’s 
period of analysis. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
2.  An overview of the Polish labour market 
This context for the work is provided by an examination of certain salient features of the Polish 
labour market over the years 1997-2007. As such, it does not review developments in the country’s 
early transition years, about which there are numerous detailed accounts, including Funck and 
Pizzati (2002), Allison and Ringold (1996), Grotkowska et al. (2005), Kramer (1995) and OECD 
(1994). The period under review can be divided conveniently into two: the years 1997-2003, over 
which Poland’s record on numerous counts was little short of disastrous, and the years 2003-2007, 
when there was a rapid and impressive reversal of fortune on many fronts. Table 1 provides the 
summary detail, with the measures highlighted being based on, although not replicating exactly, 
the list of Structural Indicators (SIs) used by the Commission to assess progress towards 
satisfaction of the Lisbon objectives in one guise or another. In particular, the youth 
unemployment rate is a rather conspicuous absentee from the current SIs given the attention 
devoted to it not only in the EES Employment Guidelines, but also by Delors in his path-breaking 
White Paper (E. Comm., 1993). 
 
1997-2003 
Between 1997, when its application for membership of the EU was recognised formally by the 
Council (E. Comm., 1997; EC, 1997), and 2003, Poland’s performance against many of the 4 | Page 
 
ambitions and targets of the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Lisbon Agenda, under 
which the EES was subsumed in 2000 (EC, 2000), had been woeful, as Table 1 elaborates. Thus, 
notwithstanding healthy economic growth rates over the period, with the exception of the 
slowdown experienced in 2001 and 2002, progress was secured not simply without employment 
creation, but with the loss of some 1.5 million jobs. Set in the context of what had evolved by 2003 
into the lowest employment rate in the then EU-15 and the ten countries that were to accede in the 
following year, the conflict with the Lisbon target of an employment rate of 70 per cent for those 
aged 15 to 64 by 2010 was all too evident. Furthermore, the country’s unemployment rate of nearly 
20 per cent was higher than that of any existing or accession country. However, relatively high 
growth in the face of falling employment did at least mean that Poland achieved impressive 
productivity improvements, thereby satisfying at least one of the, often seemingly contradictory, 
goals set in order to achieve the Lisbon ambitions. The impact of this on living standards, as 
measured by GDP per capita in PPS, was nevertheless muted by the low labour utilisation rate and 
Poland’s convergence towards the EU-15 norm was slower than its differential growth 
performance might otherwise have led one to expect. 
In addition to maintaining an aggregate employment rate target, the Council also set goals 
for females and for older workers, defined as those between the ages of 55 and 64. In the former 
case, the ambition espoused at Lisbon was to achieve a figure of sixty per cent by 2010, with 
Poland again performing poorly. Given growing demographic pressures, the Stockholm Spring 
Council of 2001 (EC, 2001) formalised the EU’s labour market ambitions for older workers by 
setting a target employment rate of fifty per cent, again to be achieved by 2010. The generous and 
frequently criticised Polish early retirement and disability pension provisions of the time (E. 5 | Page 
 
Comm., 2006; OECD, 2004; World Bank, 2004) clearly made this appear a rather fanciful 
aspiration. 
While the attainment of full employment represents a convenient short-hand for Europe’s 
labour market goals, they are often portrayed in overtly social terms, with the prevention of social 
exclusion being high on the agenda. Reductions in both long-term and youth unemployment are 
viewed as making important contributions in this regard (E. Comm., 2002). In the former case, the 
Commission has elected to focus primarily on the number of people unemployed for twelve 
months or more, deflated by the total economically active population of the relevant gender. 
Poland’s situation clearly deteriorated in the years leading up to its accession and, by 2003, the 11 
per cent of the workforce without work for more than a year was exceeded only in Slovakia out of 
all present 27 Member States. Put somewhat more vividly, the Polish figure for the latter year 
translated into 55 per cent of all unemployed being long-term workless. Indeed, by the fourth 
quarter LFS of that year, some 22.6 per cent had been without a job for more than 24 months. That 
the situation on the post-1997 labour market evolved into a near crisis is exemplified further by the 
plight of young people. Thus, while the general tendency throughout the EU was for reduction, or 
at least relative stability, Poland witnessed a near doubling of its youth unemployment rate in the 
years to 2003 to over 42 per cent. 
 
2003-2007 
The deterioration of the labour market situation in the first six years of its pre-accession epoch 
clearly called for a radical policy response and, in 2002, the government unveiled a quite 
comprehensive reform package (“Entrepreneurship – Development – Work”) with this purpose in 
mind. It must be noted, however, that Poland was struggling with its fiscal commitments under the 6 | Page 
 
Stability and Growth Pact (E. Comm., 2004a), due in large part to its failure to contain public 
expenditure on social protection, and the effectiveness of any such reform programme was always 
questionable. Indeed, that part of the scheme targeted at unemployed young people (First Job) was 
abandoned in 2005 largely on grounds of cost (Surdej, 2008). It is significant therefore that a 
fundamental revision of the Labour Code, inspired by Jerzy Hausner, the then Minister of Labour 
and Social Policy, was also introduced in 2002, which, most notably, liberalised the country’s 
temporary working provisions. 
With growth resumed at respectable levels in the years from 2003, this time the economy 
did generate jobs and, by 2007, the increase in employment more than compensated for the losses 
endured in the period examined above. This new work had one dominant characteristic, which is 
that 85 per cent of it was performed under temporary contracts. In consequence, Poland lagged 
only Spain in the EU-27 in terms of the significance of such labour in 2007. Note though should be 
made of the fact that this paper does not distinguish between fixed-term workers hired directly by 
the employing enterprise and those recruited through temporary work agencies. The justification 
for this is twofold. First, the Polish LFS questionnaire did not make the distinction until 2006. 
Second, while growing, temporary agency workers (TAWs) made up only 1.7 per cent of those on 
short-term assignments in 2007. 
The alternative possible explanation for the growth in employment was EU accession in 
2004. However, integration with the Single Market had largely been achieved well before then; for 
example, 80 per cent of Poland’s exports and 70 per cent of its imports were with the EU by the 
year 2000, levels that remained more or less constant for the rest of the decade. Admittedly, there 
was a surge in FDI inflows in the years from 2003, but this was a phenomenon shared by virtually 
every sub-region of the world and was not restricted to New Member States. Also, past booms in 7 | Page 
 
FDI, as in the years 1998 to 2000, were not associated with any employment growth, let alone with 
a surge in temporary working. EU membership did, of course, bring with it the free movement of 
labour, although this did not initially cover all Member States and, furthermore, the fall in 
unemployment in Poland was more or less matched by the increase in employment. In addition, 
migration was not impossible prior to accession and freedom of movement probably served simply 
to legitimise some portion of it that was formerly illegal. 
The increase in employment was reflected in a fall of unemployment by 1.7 million, 
reducing its rate below ten per cent for the first time since the inception of the country’s LFS in 
1992. Furthermore, the overall employment rate and those for females and older workers 
increased, although the figures attained were still well below the Lisbon targets and remained less 
than those achieved in 1997. Rather predictably, labour productivity, while still growing, did so at 
a somewhat slower pace than previously. Convergence in real GDP per capita continued, although 
its speed, as in most other new entrants, remained slow. One of the most notable achievements of 
the years following 2003 was the reduction in youth unemployment, which halved. Seemingly 
equally impressive was the fall in long-term unemployment as a percentage of the active 
population. However, it must be noted that this still masked a situation in which over half of all 
unemployed individuals had been without work for more than a year. 
 
3.  Temporary work 
The use of fixed-term contracts and TWAs varies considerably across EU space, with 
Poland and Spain having twenty per cent or more of all employees on fixed-term contracts in 2005, 
while, in Austria, the figure was only just over four per cent.
2 From Table 2 it is apparent that, in 
most Member States, the majority of workers still have permanent contracts, with the only 
exceptions being the two small island states of Cyprus and Malta. Casual inspection of the data 8 | Page 
 
does not reveal any systematic differences between the original EU-15 and the new entrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding the recent attention they have received, temporary 
agencies only accounted for one and a half per cent of all employment contracts, with their 
penetration being highest in Greece, where the figure exceeded four per cent. Finally, almost nine 
per cent of employed workers in the EU apparently had no formal contract of employment at all, 
with the numbers being particularly high in Greece, Ireland and Malta. 
Table 2 about here 
  The extent to which fixed-term contracts and TAWs are favoured by employers is likely to 
depend upon the relative ease with which they can dismiss temporary and permanent employees. A 
common way of measuring this is the OECD’s Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index 
(OECD, 2004), which is a multi-faceted measure covering the overall strictness of employment 
security regulations. The expectation is that ceteris paribus there will be a positive relationship 
between the percentage of employees in temporary jobs and the EPL index for permanent workers 
and, conversely, a negative relationship between the percentage of temporary workers and their 
own EPL index. Estimates of these simple relationships are shown in Figures 1 and 2, wherein 
temporary workers include both those on fixed-term contracts and TAWs.
3 The former of the 
Figures shows the anticipated, albeit weak, positive relationship. There are three clear outliers: 
Poland and Spain both have a very high percentage of workers on temporary contracts, given the 
values of their EPL indices, while the reverse holds true for Austria. Figure 2 reveals the 
anticipated negative relationship in the latter case, although the simple regression line is very 
poorly determined. Four countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the UK – have low 
employment protection for temporary workers, whereas it is particularly high in France and 
Greece. Once again, Austria, Poland and Spain are distinct outliers. 9 | Page 
 
Figures 1 & 2 about here 
The EU’s temporary work Directives 
The Essen Council Resolutions on the 1999 Employment Guidelines invited the social 
partners to address issues relating to the modernisation of the organization of working 
arrangements in an attempt to make the Union more productive and competitive (OJ, 1999). In the 
same year, the Directive on Fixed Term Work (OJ, 1999a) was issued.
4 In the Directive, Member 
States were charged with ensuring that a series of safeguards for fixed-term workers were put into 
place. First, the non-discrimination clause required that they were to be treated on equal terms with 
those on open-ended contracts in terms of pay and working conditions. Second, measures were to 
be taken to combat the abuse of such workers; for example, by keeping an individual on a series of 
short-term contracts when, in reality, the job that they were doing was a permanent one. Third, 
fixed-time contract staff were to be informed about any relevant vacancies that arose within the 
organization. Finally, employers were to facilitate access to training for these workers so that they 
could enhance their skills, career development and occupational mobility. 
It was not until November 2008 that the Commission issued a Directive on temporary 
agency work (OJ, 2008). This states that TAWs are to be offered working and employment 
conditions at least as good as those offered to permanent employees. The provisions within this 
Directive cover pay, health and safety, social insurance, paid leave entitlement, access to training 
and the right to receive notification of vacancies. 
 
Temporary work legislation in Poland 
Article 25 of the 1996 Polish Labour Code dictated that three successive fixed-term contract 
renewals, with a maximum duration of three months each, automatically meant that the worker’s 10 | Page 
 
legal status would be that of a permanent employee. Hausner’s revised Labour Code enacted in 
August 2002 abolished both time limits and restrictions on the successive number of permissible 
renewals. Amongst other reforms, it also provided for the use of substitution agreements whereby 
a temporary employee could replace a permanent worker on justified absence, for example 
through sick or maternity leave. Previously, no recognition of such a possibility was afforded 
under Polish labour law. Furthermore, employers are only required to give temporary staff two 
weeks’ notice, whereas permanent workers enjoy notice periods of up to three months, and, in the 
former case, no reason for dismissal need be provided. Even when the legislation was framed, it 
was recognised that it would need to be amended on accession in order to comply with the 
Fixed-Term Work Directive. In the event, the revision adopted in 2004 merely reinstated the rule 
that a third temporary contract would be presumed to be a permanent one, but with no time limit on 
their length being imposed.
5 
Having first been recognised in law in 2001, the most important piece of legislation 
covering temporary agency work is the Temporary Employment Agencies Act, effective from 
April 2004. This provided for the use of TAWs in a wide, although not universal, range of 
circumstances. In general, they cannot work for a single employer for more than 12 months in any 
consecutive three year period, although this can be extended to 36 months if the posting is to cover 
an absent employee.
6 In the latter case, however, the agency worker cannot return to the same firm 
for another 36 months. In addition, the Act imposed various non-discrimination clauses between 
temporary and permanent employees, although not necessarily equal pay. Against the wishes of 
the Ministry of Labour, the legislated Act still made it possible to employ TAWs on civil contracts, 




4.  Labour market dynamics 
While there is a large body of literature dealing with temporary work, the emphasis to date in 
micro-studies has been on whether such positions act as a springboard to a permanent job or 
whether individuals employed on fixed-term contracts cycle between them and repeated spells of 
unemployment and the impact of temporary work on future earnings (see, for example, 
Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2006); Autor and Houseman (2005); Blanchard and Landier (2002), 
Böheim and Weber (2006), Booth et al., 2002; Gerfin et al. (2005); Ichino et al., 2008; Maloney, 
1999). This paper aims to complement this research by examining the source states of temporary 
workers and the factors that influence the likelihood of making the observed transitions.  
 
Aggregate state transitions 
Initial attention focuses on gross conditional transition probabilities. These relate to 
movements in status defined by enumerating the number of people who are in a given labour 
market state at some initial period (t0) and then calculating what proportion of them are in each 
labour market state at the terminal time (t1). For this purpose, individuals are located in one of 
seven exhaustive, mutually exclusive situations; permanent paid employment, temporary paid 
employment, self-employment, unpaid family workers (UFWs), unemployed, discouraged 
workers and other economically inactive. While the rationale for this selection is largely 
self-evident, brief comment on some of the choices is merited. 
As above, temporary workers include those who have been hired directly by their 
employers or have been placed by TWAs. The self-employed have been identified separately, not 
simply because they are relatively numerous in the context of the EU, but also because various 
authors have pointed to the way that Polish employers have coerced erstwhile employees to set up 
on their own account in order to avoid the rigours of the country’s employment legislation (Portet, 12 | Page 
 
op. cit.). The relaxation of the temporary work rules might have been expected to reduce this 
pressure. While not unknown elsewhere in the EU, Poland has a not insignificant number of 
individuals who claim to be unpaid family workers.
8 It is therefore of some interest to examine the 
extent to which those with this status were affected by the legislative change. Finally, the inactive 
were divided into two groups – discouraged and other – because it seems highly likely that their 
motivations and reactions to the liberalisation of the labour market regime would differ. The 
discouraged are those who said they did not believe they would find a job or had stopped searching 
because they had already tried everything without success. Activation of such individuals is core to 
the Lisbon Strategy’s means of both dealing with ageing populations, which is as important in 
Poland as elsewhere, and for reducing social exclusion. The group of others consists not only of 
those who are out of the labour force because of domestic responsibilities or through genuine 
retirement, but also the many in Poland who have retired early or have accessed disability benefits. 
As noted earlier, the latter two segments of the Polish population have long been a target of the 
Commission. 
In the Polish LFS, individuals are interviewed for two consecutive quarters, then dropped 
for the following two quarters, after which they re-enter the sample for another two quarters before 
being discarded. This means that three possible panels can be constructed from the Survey 
covering one quarter, one year and 15 months, respectively. In this paper, attention focuses on the 
annual data and figures from the five such panels for the period 2002 to 2007 are used. The 
transition summaries in Table 3 are an aggregation of the labour market flows that occurred in each 
of the individual panels, with the inflows into temporary work being reported in the third column. 
The results indicate that, even amongst those in fixed-term positions, there is a strong state 
persistence. Almost seventy per cent of those employed in a temporary post in the base year were 13 | Page 
 
still on a temporary contract twelve months later, either with the same employer or another one. 
Inflows to temporary work from permanent positions were predictably low, with less than two per 
cent making such moves. Gross inflows of the same order of magnitude were also observed for 
those leaving self-employment and other inactivity. Although the flows were higher for UFWs and 
discouraged individuals, neither exceeded four per cent. The most notable finding, however, 
relates to the movements from unemployment to temporary work, with almost 16 per cent of the 
jobless making this transition over the time period considered. This outcome suggests the 
important role that temporary jobs played in reducing Poland’s unemployment rate. 
Table 3 about here 
  An alternative way of exploring these flows is to examine movements between states 
relative to the terminal stocks and these transitions are presented in Table 4. This reveals that 
almost 19 per cent of individuals in temporary employment at t1 were previously unemployed, 
while a further 11 per cent had been economically inactive. Not unexpectedly given its size, 
permanent employment constituted another significant source of temporary workers, with six per 
cent of the closing stock having such a background.
9 
Table 4 about here 
 
A multinomial logit model of micro-flows 
Formally, the multinomial logit model (MNLM) can be expressed as: 
  Ω |         
      |  
      |         |  for m=1 to J   14 | Page 
 
where b is the base category. Given that   Ω |          1 0 ,   then   |  must equal 0. This 
means that the log odds of an outcome compared to itself are always zero and therefore the effects 
of the independent variables must also be zero.  
The MNLM makes the assumption commonly known as the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), which means that the odds ratio for any two alternatives should not depend on 
the other alternatives that are available. Two common tests of IIA are those proposed by Hausman 
and McFadden (HM) (1984) and Small and Hsiao (SM) (1985). However, it is commonly found 
that the HM and SM tests provide conflicting evidence on whether the IIA assumption is upheld.
10 
Furthermore, Cheng and Long (2007) found that the size properties of both of these tests can be 
extremely poor and the authors concluded that they are not useful for ascertaining the validity of 
IIA. McFadden (1974) and Long and Freese (2006) therefore advocate care in specifying the 
model such that it has distinct alternatives and that is the approach adopted here.
11 
The estimated model in this case is: 
       |  
       |  
                                                    
                                                        
                                                   
  
   
       
with specific definitions, together with descriptive statistics, being presented in the Appendix. 
Here comment is restricted to general observations and the rationale underlying the inclusion of 
the regressors. 
TERTIARY, VOCSEC. GENSEC and LOWERSEC are dummy variables that identify the 
highest level of education attained by LFS respondents, with the base category being those with, at 
best, primary education. Notwithstanding major reforms of the primary and secondary education 15 | Page 
 
systems in 1991 and 1998 and an enormous expansion of higher education, including the 
emergence of many private sector universities, the labour market relevance and adequacy of Polish 
education at all levels remains an issue of debate (OECD, 2006). Fixed-term contracts could 
conceivably be an input to overcoming such reservations, although it should be noted that OECD 
(2002) pointed to the heavy concentration of temporary working amongst the less well educated. 
Nevertheless, their evidence indicated that this was not a universal phenomenon with the UK, for 
example, exhibiting more temporary employment for higher educational strata. 
YOUNG is a dichotomous variable that identifies workers under the age of 25; a group that 
the international evidence suggests are heavily over-represented amongst fixed-term workers (E. 
Comm., 2007; OECD, 2002). It will also be recalled that the labour market plight of young people 
was one of the major driving forces behind the 2002 reforms, making inclusion of the identifier a 
natural point of departure. FEMALE is a standard shift dummy variable taking the value one for 
the women in the sample, although it might be noted that in the OECD in general there is no real 
evidence of a gender bias in the temporary workforce (OECD, op. cit.). 
At the same time as the situation of young people in Poland was a cause of concern, so too 
was that of older workers. In the latter case, however, the problem was perceived less in terms of 
unemployment than in premature labour market exit and the impact that, in principle, it had on the 
employment rate (E. Comm., 2001). At the heart of the problem was the ease with which many 
workers could access relatively generous early and pre-retirement benefits. In fact, two reforms 
have been introduced that are designed to influence the opportunity set confronting older workers. 
The first was the change from a pay-as-you-go pension scheme to a funded system in 1999 for 
those aged under fifty at its inception.
12 This provided such workers with the incentive to develop 
longer social insurance contribution histories. The second was a tightening of the early retirement 16 | Page 
 
pension eligibility criteria with effect from 2002, although this was far from comprehensive.
13 
These amended incentives for those entering later working life provide the justification for the 
inclusion of a dummy variable identifying those males aged 55-64 and females aged 50-59 in the 
current sample (OLDER). The model also includes a dummy variable equal to unity for those 
beyond the official retirement age (POSTWORK), which, for now, remains at 65 for men and 60 
for women. Its inclusion is merited on the grounds that temporary employment may be a rational 
strategy for these seeking a staged labour market exit and because fixed-term contracts may be 
more likely to induce firms to hire such workers. HOH identifies those individuals who claim to be 
head of their household, while those with a disability, a segment of the Polish population that has 
long been an object of concern (E. Comm., 2003; 1997), are captured by the dummy variable 
DISABLED. 
The remaining variables reflect, to some extent, the prevailing local and national 
socio-economic environment. First, TOWN takes the value of one for those who lived in a town as 
opposed to a village. While this distinction is somewhat arbitrary, it goes a long way towards 
singling out those who lived in urban as opposed to rural localities.
14 The interest in this 
distinction stems from the rural development deficit that has long been recognised in Poland 
(MARD, 2007; E. Comm., 1997) driven, in part, by an un-restructured semi-subsistence 
agriculture that houses a good deal of disguised unemployment. Second, GROWTH measures the 
rate of increase of real national GDP, with there being some evidence that the availability of 
temporary jobs is pro-cyclical (OECD, 2002). Finally, the vi are voivodship dummies, with the 
base region being Mazowieckie
15. 
The results for the MNLM are presented in Tables 5 and 6, with the associated Wald tests 
for variable significance given in Table 7. These tests reject the null hypothesis that the estimated 17 | Page 
 
parameter values across equations are jointly statistically insignificant for all of the variables. An 
additional series of Wald tests was undertaken to see if there was evidence to suggest that any of 
the seven labour market states could be combined. The results, presented in Table 8, show that the 
data reject all possible combinations, hence each is retained as a separate category in the empirical 
analysis. The MNLM coefficient values reported in Table 5 represent the impact on the log of the 
odds of moving into temporary work from one of the alternative labour market states, relative to an 




For moves out of unemployment into short-term work, all of the education dummies bar 
LOWERSEC are statistically significant and negative, which suggests that it is the least well 
educated who have been drawn most intensively from the unemployment pool into temporary 
positions. The results also indicate that individuals with general or lower secondary education 
were more likely than others to make the move from the other inactive group to temporary work 
and, of those claiming to be discouraged in the initial time period, the respondents with tertiary 
education were the least likely to take up a short-term post. As far as moves from permanent 
employment to a temporary job are concerned, there is some evidence, albeit at the 10% 
significance level, that possession of vocational secondary education increased the odds of making 
this move whereas being educated only to lower secondary level reduced it. Collectively, these 
results concur with the OECD’s (2002) finding that it is those with poorer educational attainments 




The results suggest that the upsurge in temporary working did not disproportionately favour 
younger unemployed workers, but neither did it discriminate against them and their 
unemployment rate fell in line with the overall figure. However, those aged less than 25 were more 
likely to leave other inactivity – often presumably some form of extended education – and family 
positions for a temporary post than were others. Conversely, there is no evidence that fixed-term 
openings unduly facilitated the exit of older respondents from the other inactive category. 
However, amongst discouraged individuals, those approaching retirement were more likely to 
move to a temporary job than those of all other ages, whereas those in the POSTWORK group were 
less likely to make this transition. There is therefore some evidence that fixed-term contracts may 
prolong the labour market careers of certain older workers. This is reinforced by the result 
indicating that the move from a permanent position to a short-term one was more likely for those in 
the older working age group, while youths had reduced odds of so doing. 
In the particular case of Poland, the findings highlight significant differences between men 
and women with respect to temporary working. Thus, females were less likely to enter fixed-term 
posts from permanent jobs, self-employment, unemployment and the discouraged inactive group, 
but were more likely to make the transition from other inactivity. This latter finding may be 
indicating that fixed-term positions offer women a route back into the labour market following a 
career break. 
Heads of households were less likely to move from unemployment and labour market 
inactivity into a temporary post, which may reflect the operation of various benefit traps in Poland. 
The results also show that while suffering a disability reduced the likelihood of an individual 19 | Page 
 
moving from a permanent position, family post or discouragement into a short-term one, there is 
evidence they were drawn out of inactivity into temporary posts. 
 
Socio-economic environment 
  Of the socio-economic variables included in the model, GROWTH was statistically 
significant in four of the transitions modelled. For the flows out of permanent jobs, unemployment 
and other inactivity, the parameter estimates are all negative. The first of these findings is easy to 
rationalise, although the latter two are somewhat puzzling in an era when virtually all new jobs 
were temporary. In contrast, the parameter estimate was positive and significant for the transition 
out of the discouraged category, which is more in line with the findings from elsewhere that 
fixed-term working behaves pro-cyclically. 
  The results for the second indicator in this group, TOWN, show that individuals in urban 
areas were more likely to rejoin the labour market by leaving other inactivity to take up a 
temporary post than were similar individuals domiciled in rural localities. On the other hand, this 
finding was reversed for inflows from self-employment, which is at least suggestive of a process 
wherein the growth in temporary working succeeded in drawing individuals from the farming 
sector, where restructuring remains to be completed. 
For reasons of economy, the regional dummy variables included in the model are not 
reported in Table 5, but are summarised in Table 6, which lists those that were statistically 
significant for each transition. With two major exceptions, the results indicate little systematic 
variation in the inflows across regions. Most notable was that nine of them achieved statistical 
significance, and were negative, in the transition from a permanent position to a fixed-term one. 
The regions concerned have little in common; geographically they are dispersed and, whereas 20 | Page 
 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie, previously the home of the state farms, consistently posted the highest 
unemployment rates in the country, those in Wielkopolskie ranks amongst the lowest. 
For the flows out of inactivity, five voivodship parameter estimates are positive and 
significant; Lubelskie, Podlaskie, Śląskie, Świętorkryskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie. This 
suggests that temporary contracts have been successful in drawing people back into the labour 
market in areas with very different underlying characteristics. Thus, whilst historically Lubelskie, 
Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie were agricultural, the former two still house small-scale 
private agriculture, whilst the latter lost many jobs when the state farms collapsed and now suffers 
the most severe social problems in the country. In contrast, Śląskie and Świętorkryskie are far 
more industrialised, with the former housing Katowice where the former Nova Huta steelworks 
are based. All other flows appear to have been relatively neutral across Polish regional space.  
  
5.  Postscript: 2007 and beyond 
The analysis in this paper covers the period to the second quarter of 2007, with the findings 
indicating a marked improvement in various labour market indicators in the five preceding years. 
Since that time, there have been two major developments that might have been expected to reverse 
at least some of the advances made over that period. The first was the global economic crisis.  
Between the third quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009, Eurostat data indicate that the 
EU-27 endured a loss of almost three million jobs. In Estonia this translated into an employment 
fall of over ten per cent and, even in the evidently flexible environment obtaining in Spain, a 
reduction of 7.6 per cent. In Poland, on the other hand, employment grew by more than 400,000, 
an increase of 2.7 per cent. What is more, while the number of workers on temporary contracts 
held steady and therefore the percentage of the workforce employed on temporary contracts fell 21 | Page 
 
back slightly, the latest available figure for the second quarter of 2009 (26.5) is now the largest of 
any EU Member State. 
The second was that, as suggested above, the Polish legislation on temporary employment 
is too liberal to satisfy the precepts of the EU’s Fixed-Term Work Directive. This was confirmed 
in 2008 when the Commission released its assessments of the transposition of the Directive by 
Member States (E. Comm., 2008). Its criticisms included, first, that the Polish legislation does not 
provide equal protection for all classes of temporary worker. Second, that it is easier to terminate a 
temporary contract than a permanent one. Third, that there are no limits on the possible duration of 
a fixed-term employment contract. Fourth, while the Labour Code does state that the maximum 
number of successive temporary contracts that can be concluded between an employer and a 
worker is three, the definition of successive is that there be less than one month between them. The 
Commission has now queried whether the latter time limit is long enough. Fifth, no objective 
reasons are needed to enter into or to renew a fixed-term contract. It is apparent from the language 
of the report that the laxity of Poland’s efforts in these areas will be challenged in the future, even 
if this would seem unlikely in the current economic environment. 
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
The last few years have witnessed a strong reversal in the fortunes of Poland’s labour market. 
There have been both a large increase in employment and a sharp reduction in unemployment. 
Furthermore, the improvements have persisted through at least the first two years of the global 
economic downturn. The driving force behind these developments would appear to be the 
amendments to the Labour Code adopted in 2002 which, most notably, relaxed many previous 
constraints on the employment of temporary workers. Indeed, 85 per cent of the growth in 22 | Page 
 
employment between their introduction and 2007 was made up of workers on fixed-term contracts.  
This has meant that Poland has moved from a position where it had one of the lowest temporary 
work intensities in what was to be the EU-27 to having its highest. 
Of major significance for public policy is that the increase in the temporary workforce has 
drawn many individuals from the unemployment pool: a feat that several years of healthy 
economic growth alone had previously failed to accomplish. On the basis of the findings of a 
MNLM examining flows onto fixed-term contracts from six other labour market states over the 
years 2002-2007, the erstwhile unemployed tended to be males with relatively low levels of 
educational attainment, the latter being a group that had long faced particular difficulties on the 
labour market. While the time period examined is clearly short, there was further evidence that the 
flows into temporary posts were negatively related to the rate of growth of the overall economy 
which, if the relationship persists, could be a useful additional hedge against a return to 
unemployment rates of twenty per cent and chronic levels of long-term joblessness. At the very 
least, the Polish labour market weathered the first two years of the current economic crisis better 
than those of many other Member States. There was also evidence that the upsurge in temporary 
jobs attracted formerly discouraged workers approaching retirement back into employment, which 
could have beneficial implications for the social security budget that has been identified as a 
contributory factor in Poland’s struggle to meet its obligations under the EU’s Stability and 
Growth Pact. At the same time, it could be a useful weapon in the fight against the near universal 
problem of dealing with an ageing population and meeting the targets set under the Lisbon 
Agenda. 
However, such arguments should not be marshalled without recognising that, in injecting 
some much needed flexibility into its labour market, Poland has been adjudged by the European 23 | Page 
 
Commission to have gone too far. In particular, its temporary employment laws now contravene 
the EU’s Fixed-Term Work Directive and will need to be tightened at some point in the future. 
While it seems unlikely that the Commission would insist upon such moves in the middle of a 
severe recession, when it does, Poland may be confronted with a major dilemma. The country’s 
public finances are not such as to allow it to adopt the Danish approach to flexicurity, whereby 
liberal but compliant levels of flexibility are combined with a generous social security system and 
mandatory activation programmes for the unemployed. It is therefore to be hoped that whatever 
amendments are made to its temporary working provisions do not lead to a rehearsal of the debate 
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Table 1: Key labour market indicators 1997-2007 
 1997  2003  2007 
 Poland  EU-15  Polan
d 
EU-15 Poland EU-15 
Annual ave real GDP 
growth 1997-2003 & 
2004-2007 
   3.9  2.4  5.4  2.4 
Tot emp (000s)  15229.5 151724.5  13616.
8 
164799.1 15240.5 175249.4 
Tot emp rate 15-64 (%)  58.9  60.7  51.2  64.5  57.0  67.0 
Real lab prod ppe (2000 = 
100) 
85.7 96.1  123.4  101.7 136.9  106.7 
GDP per cap (PPS)  7600  18700 10100  23600  13400 27800 
Fem emp rate 15-64 (%)  51.3  50.8  46.0  56.2  50.6  59.7 
Emp rate 55-64 (%)  33.9  36.4  26.9  41.7  29.7  46.5 
U>12mth (% econ act)  5.0  4.8  11.0  3.3  4.9  2.8 
U>12mth (% tot U)  46.4 48.6 55.9  41.4 51.3 40.2
U  15-24  (%)  23.2 19.6  41.9  15.3  21.7 14.7 
Source: Eurostat (2009). 
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EU-27  76.0 11.1  1.5  0.9  8.6  7.6 
Austria  77.3  4.1 1.4 1.1  8.6  1.3 
Belgium  88.3  5.9 1.1 0.4  2.6  1.8 
Bulgaria  70.0 19.2  2.5  0.8  5.7  1.7 
Cyprus  46.1  8.3 3.7 41.5  0.4  0.0 
Czech Republic  75.4 14.6  1.7  5.5  1.3  1.4 
Denmark  80.3  7.2 1.9 0.9  8.9  0.9 
Estonia  81.2  9.5 0.9 0.5  6.5  1.5 
Finland  79.1 15.0  0.5  1.2  2.2  2.0 
France  82.6  8.3 2.9 0.8  3.7  1.7 
Germany  83.9  8.5 1.2 1.9  3.5  1.1 
Greece  52.8  9.9 4.1 0.3  28.2 4.6 
Hungary  82.2 12.7  0.9  0.1  4.2  0.0 
Ireland  59.7 10.5  3.0  0.9  24.7  1.3 
Italy  72.8 12.2  1.1  3.2  8.2  2.4 
Latvia  85.0  9.1 0.8 0.4  3.9  0.9 
Lithuania  81.2  9.6 0.9 0.3  5.8  2.2 
Luxembourg  88.1  7.8 0.6 1.1  0.4  2.1 
Malta  49.2  8.9 0.0 0.4  39.1 2.4 
Netherlands  83.1 12.2  1.4  0.3  1.9  1.1 
Poland  69.9 20.0  2.1  0.7  5.8  1.4 
Portugal  70.6 15.7  1.8  1.1  8.5  2.3 
Romania  87.4  5.5 0.6 0.1  4.4  1.9 
Slovakia  83.5 13.7  0.5  0.3  1.3  0.6 
Slovenia  76.9 13.0  0.7  0.4  8.6  0.4 
Spain  66.0 20.8  2.5  1.5  8.1  1.1 
Sweden  85.1 12.0  0.6  0.2  0.1  1.9 
UK  66.0 13.2  2.6  1.1  14.7  2.4 30 | Page 
 
Note: ‘Other etc.’ includes ‘Other’, ‘Don’t Know/No Opinion, ‘Refusal’. 























































































Table 3: Conditional outflow transition probabilities 2002-2007 
 
State at t1  Perm Temp  Selfemp UFW Unemp Discouraged Other inactive Stock at t0 
State at t0 
Perm 0.9240 0.0189 0.0056  0.0012 0.0168  0.0018  0.0317 21036 
Temp 0.1571 0.6868 0.0130  0.0044 0.0837  0.0059  0.0491  6131 
Selfemp 0.0100 0.0125 0.9205  0.0195 0.0100  0.0015  0.0260  9119 
UFW 0.0112 0.0292 0.0849  0.8158 0.0060  0.0012  0.0517 2497 
Unemp 0.0372 0.1554 0.0211  0.0061 0.6381  0.0465  0.0955  8146 
Discouraged 0.0081 0.0395 0.0105  0.0064 0.0733  0.6342  0.2280  1241 
Otr inactive  0.0048 0.0168 0.0041  0.0041 0.0233  0.0083  0.9386  40850 
 
Source: Polish LFS, 2002-2007, own calculations. 
Table 4: Conditional inflow transition probabilities 2002-2007 
 
State at t1  Perm Temp  Selfemp UFW Unemp Discouraged Other  inactive
State at t0 
Perm 0.9243 0.0585 0.0128  0.0100 0.0489  0.0238  0.0164 
Temp 0.0458 0.6194 0.0087  0.0108 0.0711  0.0225  0.0074 
Selfemp 0.0043 0.0168 0.9170  0.0714 0.0126  0.0088  0.0058 
UFW 0.0013 0.0107 0.0232  0.8174 0.0021  0.0019  0.0032 
Unemp 0.0144 0.1862 0.0188  0.0201 0.7205  0.02373  0.0191 
Discouraged 0.0005 0.0072 0.0014  0.0032 0.0126  0.4928  0.0069 
Otr inactive  0.0094 0.1011 0.0181  0.0670 0.1321  0.2129  0.9412 
Stock at t1  21030  6798 9154  2492 7214 1597  40735 
 
Source: Polish LFS, 2002-2007, own calculations. 34 | Page 
 




















































































































































































































































































































* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Absolute 
t-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Regional effects 







































































































































* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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2 (Prob > Χ
2) 
1 vs 3 
1 vs 4 
1 vs 5 
1 vs 6 
1 vs 7 
1 vs 2 
3 vs 4 
3 vs 5 
3 vs 6 
3 vs 7 
3 vs 2 
4 vs 5 
4 vs 6 
4 vs 7 
4 vs 2 
5 vs 6 
5 vs 7 
5 vs 2 
6 vs 7 
6 vs 2 




















































Table A1: Variable definitions 
























1 if the individual has tertiary education, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual has vocational secondary education, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual has general secondary education, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual has lower secondary education, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual is less than 35, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual is female, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual is 55-64 (men), 55-59 (women), 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual is 65+ (men), 60+ (women), 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual if head of household, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual is disabled, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the individual lives in a town, 0 otherwise. 
 






























































































1.  All of the education variables relate to the individual’s highest level of completed education. 




1 Various European Councils after Lisbon specified more precise targets, while the Mid-Term 
Review of the Strategy integrated the previously separate economic and employment guidelines 
and aimed for the improved governance of a re-launched Growth and Jobs Strategy (EC, 2005). 
2 Temporary jobs can take a number of quite distinct forms (Booth et al., 2002). 
3 The OECD computes an EPL for temporary workers by using a simple average of the individual 
indices for those on fixed-term contracts and TAWs. Given the unequal size of these two groups, a 
weighted average is used here, with the weights being the employment shares of the two groups. 
4 This Directive only covered workers with fixed-term contracts and did not apply to TAWs. 
5 On the temporary work legislation, see Portet and Sztandar-Sztanderska (2007). 
6  EFILWC (2008) reports that some less scrupulous, normally smaller, agencies flout the 12 
month restriction for TAWs by swapping the workers amongst themselves. 
7 Further consideration of the employment agencies legislation can be found in Portet (2005) and 
Portet and Szantandar-Szanderska (2007). 
8  Eurostat defines family workers as persons who help another member of the family run a farm or 
other business, provided they are not classed as employees. 
9  Bernabè and Stampini (2009) and Pages and Stampini (2007) proposed a complementary 
indicator to the standard transition matrix, namely transition tendencies, which takes account of 
the number of openings created in the destination states. On this occasion, however, the 
conclusions mirror those in Table 4 and the measure is not reported but is available from the 
authors on request. 
10 In this application, the HM test upheld the null hypothesis for all pairs of outcomes whereas the 
SH test rejected it. 
11 A multinomial probit specification could have been used as it does not assume IIA. However, 
the model frequently fails converge and, if the specification has more than three choices, it is 
normally necessary to place restrictions on the variance covariance matrix. 
12  It should be noted that those aged between thirty and fifty had to make an irrevocable choice 
between staying in the old system and entering the new one. 
13  In order to be eligible for early retirement payments individuals had to be certified as eligible 
for unemployment benefit; that is, without work. 
14 Any settlement wishing to be awarded the status of a town has to have its application approved 
by the Council of Ministers (GUS, 2009). 
15 Voivodship unemployment rates are a possible alternative to the regional dummies, but they 
suffer from the problem of hidden unemployment in rural localities. In any event, the inclusion of 
the former did not materially affect any of the other parameter estimates and the results are not 
reported. The findings are available from the authors on request. 